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Art as Language
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Elga Freiberga, Jānis Taurens and Artis Svece discuss the question
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Artis Svece: – We could start this conversation with a question of whether art can be likened to language. What exactly is the meaning of the notion „language of art”? Is it a metaphor? It seems to me there are two problems here. First, the problem of sign – in what sense can a sound or a speck of color be a sign? Second, the question of syntax – do we arrange these signs in a way that resembles a language? Is it enough that I recognize a reference to something in a movie frame or a set of frames, in order for me to say that cinema is a language?
Jānis Taurens: – I could try to give a brief characterization of the view that art is a language – in a non-metaphorical sense – and assumptions and some problems that come with this view. One can say a type of art is language, if particular representatives of this type of artistic expression, or art works, are articulated, namely, they have a structure and we ascribe to particular parts of this structure, or composites that are made of these parts, meanings we can understand. A theory of meaning of this particular type of artistic expression, or expressions of art works, would be a theory of its understanding. The analogy with verbal language will be productive, if its semantics provides us with a model of building such a theory of understanding. If we identify semantics with philosophical semantics and its original version in the works by Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus”, we can name a couple of problems such a theory most likely will encounter, and, first of all, this will be the question of expressions, or the minimal entities with a sense, of the particular type of art and the question of the syntax of these entities. As well as the question of whether the principle of compositionality is present here, namely, whether the meaning of a compositional expression is a function of the meanings of its parts.
Secondly, it seems it is impossible to express adequately in verbal language what one can say in art. One should understand this as a difference from verbal language. Therefore, it is possible to speak here about the polysemy of terms like “meaning”, “language”, etc., and their use, although not metaphoric (and therefore false if we accept the classic theory of metaphor by Donald Davidson), is still different from the way these terms are understood in the context of verbal language. Of course, one can say that the problem is not really solved in this way, rather replaced by the one of polysemy.
A somewhat different approach to semantics, namely, the one that does not separate it from pragmatics, would allow us to say that the models of understanding of art had to include concepts related to the situative and extralinguistic use of language, including those related to the roles of “speaker” and listener/viewer in the pattern of communication.
One can say, when we describe a type of art as language, we are looking for structures that are at least partially isomorphic. A weaker version of the same claim would refer to the isomorphism of theories, stronger – to the phenomenon itself, namely, to the isomorphism of language and, say, music. Thus we could obtain a certain scheme and a set of tools we could apply to art. Of course, it is possible to expand on each of the problems and themes I mentioned.
Elga Freiberga: – Yes, maybe it could be useful not just for different types of art, but different forms of art as well. There are different approaches we could take. You indicated one of the ways we could talk about this topic. I would like to stress one aspect of what you just said, namely, that the theoretical question brings us to several positions: expression, understanding, interaction. Neither of these positions can be formulated abstractly, they need concretization, that is, they can take place only within the limits of an artwork. The constant element is that the artwork has a structure that presupposes connection between its elements, there is a certain set of means of expression, there is a possibility of understanding and communicative link, or reciprocality.
One of the theoreticians of aesthetics who pins down the problem of language of arts is Nelson Goodman whose book “Languages of Art” is published in 1968. He tried to base the question of the language of arts (not art!) on the relationship between art and the world that are reciprocal, or mirroring. The link between art and the world is one of the theses that fosters the discussion on art as language and emphasizes the possibility of understanding. Even if we do not accept Goodman’s theoretical stance, we are bound to conclude that the question whether all types of art can be derived from one principle (for example, the relationship between art and the world) cannot be simply cast aside and reduced to the mutually incomparable experiences.
I object to the discredit of “metaphor” that appeared in our conversation, because the use of both metaphor and symbol for the interpretation of artworks is an important instrument of analysis, and in different types of art (music, literature, visual arts, dramatic art, etc.) it outlines the communicative principle that is also an important element of understanding. I can mention Paul Ricoeur’s and Gerard Genette’s works where this theme is developed in detail. It seems this statement should not be attributed to the use of sign (metaphor, symbol, icon, etc.), but rather the form we use “the language of art” in our conversation, otherwise we could put up some “grand narrative” that is expressed by the notion of art as language.
What is the communicative link between different types of art that allows for their understanding without referring to a theory each time. One can rephrase this question also as a problem of the use of signs: is there something universal in the use and understanding of signs, or there are just limits set by history and tradition? Do signs serve as means for transferring the meaning or as transferrers of form?
A. S.: – For example?
E. F.: – Let us presume that in order to understand the influence of Christianity on art, you look upon a cathedral and in this act of perception you “read” the signs without particular effort. The dome of the cathedral, or its form that cannot be mistaken for anything else, is a sign in the second sense. The perception makes you aware of the meaning that later becomes the condition of understanding or explanation. It is universal (in the sense, that we always have an understanding of the form of dome, even those who are not Christians) and brings us back to the meaning. I am not really part of the tradition that is represented by Goodman, but I cannot deny, that the use of signs that presupposes a transfer or a metaphor, as Goodman describes it, becomes a link that transfers meaning. What is so productive in his approach? It allows us not to translate art and meanings of art in the spirit of mimetic tradition that views certain kinds of symbols, figures, sets of sounds, or, in visual arts, colors as imitation of the perception of objects in reality. The notion of metaphor brings in this transfer that does not presume imitation or the requirement of correspondence. That is the function of metaphor.
I asked myself why there is something I find perplexing in the question of art as language as it is posed here. And I tried to go back in the past and returned to the theory that is very unpopular now, very trivial, but that has very strongly influenced the way we theoreticize about art, including the way we interpret “art as language”. I am talking about the tradition of analogy and issues associated with structuralism and post-structuralism which approached art not so much via the problem of meaning, but rather analogy. Everybody presumes that the aesthetics of structuralism and post-structuralism is first of all found in the works by Roland Barthes and Genette, but if we look at the references, we notice that Claude Levi-Strauss and Roman Jakobson are the two authors mentioned most often. They developed the basis for the analysis and the conception of analogy. They have a model that helps to understand what is analogy and why we should understand language as a transfer. This means we cannot talk about the language of art as a metaphor, because the use of language itself includes the concept of transfer. Of course, this concept of analogy is based on the model of verbal language, and this model allows one to use analogy for very different purposes. Remember, there is a text very beautifully written and the principle of analogy is applied there very consistently, I am referring to the first volume of “Mythologies”, it was called “The Raw and the Cooked” and its structure is based on Levi-Strauss sympathies towards contemporary music. He asks – where could we fix the analogy? And it is very trivial and simple, it appears in the comparison of myth and music and is demonstrated by their mutual translatability that is built into the music since the times of Richard Wagner (for example, the motive of the Potion of Love in the opera “Tristan und Isolde”) and receives its aesthetic nuance because of Nietzsche’s “The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music”. Levi-Strauss does not use the paradigm of Wagner, he uses the relationship between different systems of signs, for example, between musical sound (acoustic signs) and colors (visual signs). He points out that these are two different languages, different systems of signs, but because they are perceived as expression, or language, one can use the principle of analogy that includes the transfer.
For example, there are very few people who can write music, and this ability has several preconditions which cannot be reduced to the ability to use the syntax of music. One can learn the basic principles of composition, but I doubt many would want to play in public or record the result of their work, unless one is narcissistic dilettante. At the same time, there are lots of those who can comprehend music, in fact, almost everybody is involved in the reception of music. And this tendency, namely, the domination of acoustic signs, is much more prominent today than at the time Levi-Strauss wrote his book. He did not mention background music, for example, and wrote about his experience of “listening” to Igor Stravinsky, Pierre Boulez, Arnold Schoenberg, etc. Music, too, is based on analogy, or the transfer of similarity in the language of expression. It means that in any case when we get in touch with the phenomenon of art, the metaphoric nature of metaphor or double metaphor indicates that the claim “the language of art is metaphor” itself refers to some other level that, as far as I can see, is related both with the stance of modern art that uses paraphrase, or arrangement, or different kind of arrangement, and with the position of art theory that influences the artwork, as well as its interpretation. Because, for example, in the case of cinema, one does not have to remind about metaphor, because the existence of this art (Is cinema an art?) presumes the transfer of meaning. The level of language to which it is transferred is neither a mimetic language, nor everyday language, nor literary language. The conception of cinematic metaphor is present both in the process of making and viewing. That is determined, for example, by the conception of the structure of time, or structure of space, that is shaped by the presence of “shower/viewer”. The principle of analogy allows one to interconnect different levels of language, different structures, etc.
J. T.: – I do not like such kind of metalevels and do not like to talk about metaphors as belonging to some next level. The question that intrigues me, as far as art as language is concerned, is its difference from verbal language where the criterion of understanding is the capacity to produce new sentences and to understand them. You mentioned that in the case of music, only few can do that, so we have to ask what is the criterion for understanding of music, for example. Of course, this question leads us to a whole area of philosophical discussion. There is a position that defends elitism, and Adorno represents it, he arranges the types of listening to music. The highest is the composer himself or a person educated in music. We also have to remember the term “music” is too broad, because it is important whether we are talking about Romantic music or some trend in the late 20th century. So, what could be the criteria for understanding of music? Wittgenstein has an interesting remark that, of course, can be interpreted in very different ways: “Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think.” (“Philosophical Investigations”, §527). And in “The Blue and Brown Books” he explains what is the criterion for understanding of theme. For example, someone could claim that this melody was not performed in the right tempo and demonstrate how it should have been played, let us say, by whistling the melody. But that is possible only in the case of the music of certain period, for example, in the case of the composers Wittgenstein mentions most often, namely, Mozart, Beethoven and Schubert whose melodies he used to whistle.
One can ask whether a similar criterion of understanding can be used in the case of the 20th century music, especially if an element of contingency is incorporated in the composition, like in the music by John Cage. Therefore, if in the first case, it is possible to talk about understanding of music similar to the composer’s or necessity of knowing the formal rules of classical music, then the presence of contingent, situative, “non-musical” elements in music makes us doubt whether there is any sort of observable musical act that could be used as a criterion of understanding. More than that, we can ask whether we can talk here about understanding and music as language at all.
A. S.: – Criterion of understanding or language?
J. T.: – If we want to talk about music as language, such a claim can be defended by saying that music is a structure we understand. And if we claim this, we should clarify what is the criterion of understanding. In the case of the music of certain styles and periods, we can say it can be related to the structure of musical expressions that can be perceived only if we have knowledge of the principles of the structure of musical forms. Of course, one could object that we cannot formulate grammatical rules even though we use language. But in the case of language, the criterion is the capacity to produce sentences. In music, the criterion should be just as common and easy to follow.
E. F.: – The question I raised was not just about analogy as the basis for theoretical understanding or theoretical link between different ways of expression, but rather about the possibility to understand different types of art or different manifestations of the same type of art. What is the importance of experience? How does analogy works within our experience? The question remains important also for music. To listen, understand, perceive – is it the same thing? Because if we return to the examples of, so called, classical music, or music after Bach which can be considered to be thematized, and the music where thematization is lost, starting with symbolist music, Claude Debussy, Maurice Ravel and finishing with the music that is based on a new logical syntax and rejection of the classical principles of harmony, for example, Vienna School of atonal music, we return again to the fact that independently of how and whether we use the word “music”, each of us understands certain area of music that is his or her paradigm of listening and understanding, and it cannot be applied to music in general. But if we talk about music after Cage or, let us say, about music by Olivier Messian or Karlheinz Stockhausen, one should note that their means of expression determine a use of different kind of expressiveness, and this expressiveness is different from the arsenal of classical or other kinds music that are considered to be understandable. Nevertheless, there is certain analogon present also in the first case, otherwise we would not be able to understand any of the new means of expression: noise, or silence the effect of which can more intensive than the one produced by combination of sounds, and these elements have syntax as well.
E. F.: – The question I raised was not just about analogy as the basis for theoretical understanding or theoretical link between different ways of expression, but rather about the possibility to understand different types of art or different manifestations of the same type of art. What is the importance of experience? How does analogy works within our experience? The question remains important also for music. To listen, understand, perceive – is it the same thing? Because if we return to the examples of, so called, classical music, or music after Bach which can be considered to be thematized, and the music where thematization is lost, starting with symbolist music, Claude Debussy, Maurice Ravel and finishing with the music that is based on a new logical syntax and rejection of the classical principles of harmony, for example, Vienna School of atonal music, we return again to the fact that independently of how and whether we use the word “music”, each of us understands certain area of music that is his or her paradigm of listening and understanding, and it cannot be applied to music in general. But if we talk about music after Cage or, let us say, about music by Olivier Messian or Karlheinz Stockhausen, one should note that their means of expression determine a use of different kind of expressiveness, and this expressiveness is different from the arsenal of classical or other kinds music that are considered to be understandable. Nevertheless, there is certain analogon present also in the first case, otherwise we would not be able to understand any of the new means of expression: noise, or silence the effect of which can more intensive than the one produced by combination of sounds, and these elements have syntax as well.
A. S.: – Where is the analogy here? Between signs…
E. F.: – Between use of different signs. I would not want to use the term “structures of meaning” here, but no doubt, there are certain models of the use of signs, because the axiom of semiotics says: there are no signs without meaning. If signs are different, they have different forms, they convey something different. Of course, we cannot translate music using philosophy or something else, but the fact that we understand it is not determined just by our living at this particular time. There is a common principle of the use of signs. We can understand it not because of correspondence, or complete difference, but because one sign is somehow similar to another. That is what analogy, or the principle of analogon, is about.
A. S.: – But what about the starting point of understanding? I presume the analogy must be with something. Is it verbal language?
E. F.: – Yes, verbal language... Now, the use of verbal language, what is it? What would you suggest? Philosophical use? Literary style? What would prevail? Again, you have to arrive at certain criteria. I want to remind you of what Jānis said just a moment ago: we speak in sentences and we understand them, we produce new ones, because that is how the communicative function works and the use of it entails either understanding, or lack of understanding, but necessarily – involvement. The signs of art also contain an element of communication or structures of use. I would like to refer to the Dadaist artist Hans Arp who claimed the method of art is eclecticism because each material implies the presence of its own form. Why the communication is possible at all?
J. T.: – I would like to add that understanding of music is similar to understanding of the rules of a game. For example, a musical composition can require a radio receiver to be switched on during its performance and sounds received can become a material for further development of the composition. The audience understands this exactly as it is. But if one hears radio during the performance of Mozart’s piano concerto at the “Dzintaru” concert hall, because some vacationer has turned up the volume of his radio receiver, it is simply a nuisance. In both cases, the audience understands the rules and that, in the first case, certain sounds are part of the musical piece and, in the second case, it is just a background noise.
E. F.: – Well, but in this case the criteria seems to be just competence, education, and to certain degree, knowledge that the particular kind of music can involve certain musical elements.
A. S.: – Just knowledge of rules, nothing more.
E. F.: – I do not know, but it seems to me there is some common understanding of how signs are used. Let me mention another example that is very dear to me. You know Messian’s “Turangalila” – it is a long musical piece that includes songs of birds. Of course, you will not perceive these bird songs exactly like you perceive them when you hear them in nature, maybe you will not notice them at all.
J. T.: – Messian has a composition that has a supplement „Reveil des oiseaux” where almost 400 bird songs are used, but he said it is not necessary the audience recognizes these songs, and in fact, it is hard to imagine an urban audience that could do that. In many cases, one does not have to grasp the text of the music, also because it is sometimes deliberately transformed into something unrecognizable, like in the case of Holderlin’s poem in Luigi Nono’s opera “Prometheus”.
E. F.: – It is not necessary. The case of music is interesting because music maybe is similar (just like analogon) to the trends of the 20th century philosophy, for example, one can see similarities between use of noise and silence in music and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, or between the music of the Second Vienna School and the structural relations in Adorno’s thought. Or we can remember Husserl’s examples of melodies as an analogy of the structure of time (relationship between retention and protention). The same could be said about quoting and retelling that is a common technique in philosophy (just like in music). Somebody can perceive something as a noise, somebody else as a musical expression; noises can be combined according to our chain of associations and our experience, and the result could be a new kind of meanings. It happens when one confronts new elements with a familiar order, because if everything is familiar and the same, then there is no need for communication.
J. T.: – Another aspect of contemporary art is related to its provocative nature. For example, Stockhausen wrote about the first performance of his “Piano Piece VI” at Darmstadt seminar in 1955 – people laughed, chatted loudly, were pushing chairs. Pierre Boulez rebuked the audience using some fruity French expressions, but the noise soon reappeared. In took just a couple of yours for the audience to change dramatically, there was such a silence during the performance of the same piece one could hear a fly flying. People had accepted that this is music on a par with Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert.
And probably after such a reflection on art we can return simply to the theories of language, for example, the roles of speaker and listener.
E. F.: – It will not be as easy as that. I liked your example of Stockhausen, because it brings forward the importance of self-clarification of music. He had done a lot to explain his music, and he was not the only one, there were Stravinsky and Webern who lectured on how to listen to music. You mentioned people were booing at first and listening attentively ten years later – that is a very characteristic example of the way signs and structures work. They are conventional. Not because everybody writes just like Stockhausen, but means of expression become more or less similar. That is why they are accepted, there is a point when the communicative situation becomes universal, or rather commonplace. If Stockhausen were the only one who used these forms of expression, his situation would still be isolation.
A. S.: – Is there a particular reason why the comparison of art and language appears in philosophy? I mean, is it like establishing a fact? Maybe there are other reasons as well.
E. F.: – I am afraid it is hard to find some definite explanation of this. Sometimes it seems to me the forms of explanation are adjusted to the theories in question. When some theory appears that can be used to explain different forms of art, for example, the narrative theory that is used in the interpretation of music, visual arts, cinema, etc., this is an evidence of common processes in the explanation of art, not creation of them.
A. S.: – But why do we bring in the notion of language? Is it because the previous explanation is abandoned and we have to look for something else?
E. F.: – What does it mean “we have to look for” or “we do not look for”? In any case, art exists also in the form of explanation, not just in the form of perception and pleasure. Any theoretician and artists themselves write about the way artworks are made, what is the structure of art, what is the arrangement and what is the basis of expression. Why do such common principles of explanation appear? Maybe it is because of the same communicative function that requires to relate different possibilities of expression.
J. T.: – I can tell about myself. I began with the analogy of language and architecture, and it seemed an interesting issue to analyze. And, of course, I could not avoided thinking about the analogy with music as well, especially because Wittgenstein has a couple of remarks about the understanding of music. I thought the complex nature of architecture requires certain conceptual framework, so that we do not have to talk about architecture in terms of liking and disliking.
E. F.: – Do you know why the expression “the language of art as a metaphor” appears? In order to distinguish from the ordinary language and to notice the difference. In fact, the reason is contemporary art where these differences are hard to determine, and this distinction helps us to focus on art. Not the preestablished associations, but the unexpected ones. Unusual associations. That is why it is a metaphor. It is a metaphor not just in comparison with the ordinary language, but in comparison with the whole range of means of artistic expression.
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